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Abstract 
With the current study, we sought to add to the vexing study of human cooperation by exploring 
the following questions: 1) (how) does experiencing a social dilemma influence subsequent 
decision making, and 2) (how) does experiencing betrayal vs. loyalty in a social dilemma 
influence follow up decisions. We hypothesized that both, experiencing a social dilemma in and 
of itself, and that experiencing betrayal within a social dilemma, would negatively influence 
subsequent pro-social decision-making. To test these hypotheses, we conducted a laboratory 
study (N = 197) where participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions. In the first two conditions, subjects participated in a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma 
where they believed an in person partner either cooperated (loyalty) or defected (betrayal). In the 
third condition, subjects did not experience a social dilemma. Next, we asked participants, in an 
ostensibly unrelated task, to make a social decision. Results confirmed our first hypothesis. 
Participants that experienced a social dilemma (vs. those that did not) were twice as likely to 
make a selfish (vs. pro-social) choice in the social decision in task two. Our second hypothesis 
was unsubstantiated. There was no direct effect for betrayal on pro-social decision-making. The 
results of this study demonstrate how social dilemmas influence moral judgment. 
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Social Dilemmas and Social Decision Making 
The study of human cooperation has proven to be one of the more important and 
challenging puzzles of human behavior (Tomasello, 2009). A wealth of multi-disciplinary 
research has examined why people irrationally risk their own health and prosperity for the 
benefit of others (Rand & Nowak, 2013). This research has resulted in a plethora of explanations 
as to why people cooperate (Bernhard, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2006; Trivers, 1971). Here, we 
approach this question from a fresh perspective by integrating theory from the fields of moral 
psychology (Bazerman, & Tenbrunsel, 2010; Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 
2015) and self-control (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Forgas, 2011; Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 
2000) with methods from behavioral economics (i.e., economic games; Camerer, 2014), to 
understand how merely experiencing a social dilemma influences subsequent social decision-
making. 
Social dilemmas as incubators of social decision-making    
Researchers interested in understanding the puzzle of cooperation have relied heavily on 
experimental economic games (i.e., simulated social dilemmas; Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968; 
Parker et al., 1983) to model “social decision-making” — tradeoff decision-making that pits self-
interested and utilitarian motives against one another; e.g., Engel, 2011; Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Poundstone, 1992. These games have allowed researchers to study the 
factors that influence cooperation by systematically examining the relationship between 
psychological, social, and environmental variables and social decision-making. The social 
dilemmas that these games create have helped illuminate the psychological processes that 
underlie human moral judgment and social behavior. Moreover, the games themselves are 
flexible enough to act as both experimental outcomes, and independent variables (Hardin, 1968; 
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Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Johnson & Mislin, 2011).  
Research using simulated social dilemmas typically involves the employment of an 
experimental manipulation followed by a social decision in the context of a simulated dilemma 
(Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). For example, in a 129 study meta-analysis 
conducted on the use of the dictator game – a two-person, one-choice, social dilemma paradigm 
– Engel (2011) noted that there were over 619 different treatments (i.e. manipulations) used to 
understand the factors that influence unilateral social decision-making. These manipulations 
covered the entire social-psychological spectrum, from altering the incentive structure, to 
comparing demographic differences, and changing the power dynamics to using money instead 
of tokens. Research using the Prisoner’s Dilemma – a widely used and efficacious, two-person 
interdependent social dilemma (Poundstone, 1992) - has shown how factors such as relational 
context, perceived trust and likability, and cultural context influences moral judgment, 
cooperation, and resource distribution (Andreoni & Miller, 1993; Axelrod, 1980; Bower, Garber, 
& Watson, 1996; Fleiß, Leopold-Wildburger, 2013; Martin, Gonzalez, Juvina, & Lebiere, 2014; 
Mojolo et al., 2006; Sowden, Shamim, Calabrisotto, Kross, & Hofmann, in-prep). 
In another meta-analysis, Balliet, Parks & Joireman (2009) found eighty-two lab studies 
in which a social dilemma (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma, public goods dilemma; Dawes, McTavish et 
al., 1977, resource dilemmas such as the commons dilemma; Hardin, 1968) was employed to 
measure interactions between social value orientation and social behavior. These studies differed 
from one another along a variety of dimensions, including the operationalization of different 
types of social dilemmas to examine additional dimensions of cooperative and non-cooperative 
behavior, the employment of single or multi-round (iterated) paradigms (Andreoni & Miller, 
1993; Majolo et. all 2006), and the inclusion or exclusion of monetary payments for outcomes in 
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lab based social dilemmas (business mindset creation in studies with real monetary payments; 
Biel & Thorgersen, 2007). Moreover, while Balliet, Parks, & Joireman (2009) do not go into 
detail about the specific ways in which experimental manipulations differed between individual 
studies, other research has described the means through which social dilemma experimental 
manipulations differ from one another (Biel & Thogersen, 2007; Balliet & Van Lange, 2013).  
From Morris, Sim, & Girotto (1998)’s work exploring the effects of control and matching 
heuristics on cooperation decisions, to Camera & Casari’s (2009) altering of amounts of 
information provided to different groups of players in order to generate subsequent differences in 
cooperation levels, research carried out using social dilemmas frequently employs experimental 
manipulations prior to the player making a decision within the dilemma. These manipulations are 
developed in accordance with the researchers’ overarching study goals, and the effects the 
manipulations have on social behavior and decision-making (e.g. to cooperate or defect in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma) are measured. 
Social dilemmas as social influence 
 For the current study we propose that along with being “test-tubes” for modeling social-
decision-making outcomes, economic games are also useful in modeling social influence as a 
predictor of social decision-making. Social influence can be generally defined as the ways in 
which one individual can influence the emotions, opinions, behaviors, or decisions of another, 
and a large body of research has documented its influence on social decision-making (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). As noted earlier, the Prisoners Dilemma is an interdependent situation where each 
player’s decision to either be selfish (self-interest maximization) or cooperative (group-interest 
maximization) plays a role in determining the outcome of a game. It is this tension that makes 
the Prisoners Dilemma, and every other economic game, in and of itself a prime vehicle for 
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modeling social influence.  
Moreover, in a large experiential sampling study, Hofmann and colleagues (2014) 
demonstrated how experiencing a moral situation influences subsequent moral judgments and 
decisions in our everyday lives. This research compliments earlier laboratory research that has 
robustly shown how experiencing a social dilemma(s) shapes subsequent social decision-making 
(Axelrod, 1984). In 1981, Axelrod & Hamilton used a multi-round Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm 
to evaluate which types of social decision making strategies result in the best outcomes. Noticing 
the most successful strategy was for players to cooperate on the first move and then mimic their 
opponent’s preceding move on their second, Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) described this 
phenomenon as the Tit-for-Tat strategy. Taken in combination with findings from other research 
that players in multi-round trust games alter their behaviors or strategies in response to new 
information about the other players (Bower, Garber, & Watson, 1996), and that cooperation in 
the single trial prisoner’s dilemma is frequently attributed to peoples’ efforts to replicate the 
cooperation levels others display towards them (Hofstadter, 1985), we begin to gain an 
understanding of how previous exposure to social dilemmas influences decision making in a 
follow up task.  
While a plethora of research regarding iterated social dilemmas exists on the effects of 
previous experience on social behavior (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Rand et. all, 2014; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1993), little research has been done on the effects of how having to make one social 
decision directly influences follow up decisions. In the present study, we build on Hofmann and 
colleagues (2014) finding and Axelrod & Hamilton’s (1981) methodology by linking two 
unrelated social dilemmas together to explore the relationship between experiencing a social 
dilemma and making an unrelated social decision. To do this, we used a modified version of the 
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Prisoner’s Dilemma as the independent variable and a separate social decision as the dependent 
variable.  
Social dilemmas and moral depletion 
For our first hypothesis we predicted that making a choice within a social dilemma would 
lead to increases in selfish decision making in a follow up task. We made this prediction based 
on the theories of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), social dilemmas as conflicts of self-
control (Sheldon & Fishbach, 2015), and ego-depletion (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & 
Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Just like we are motivated to see ourselves as 
healthy and successful (e.g., oriented towards health and financial goals), we are also motivated 
to see ourselves as moral and cooperative (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002). Recently, ethical 
dilemmas (tradeoffs involving honesty & deception) have been characterized as conflicts of self-
control and research using this theorizing has found that factors that facilitate self-control for 
other types of goals (e.g., heath and financial) also promote ethical behavior (Sheldon & 
Fishbach, 2015). We posit that theorizing ethical dilemmas as conflicts of self-control should 
also extend to the selfish and cooperative tradeoffs made within social dilemmas. When people 
experience a social dilemma they must exercise self-control regardless of the decision that they 
make. If they decide to be selfish (e.g., defect) they must negate their moral or cooperative 
motives (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Conversely, if they decide to cooperate they must 
negate their self-interested motives (Bocain & Wojciszke, 2014). One theory of self-control, ego-
depletion posits that regulating oneself is mentally taxing, and this mental taxation negatively 
affects performance in subsequent decisions requiring self-control (Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 
1998; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). With this, we hypothesize that by experiencing a social 
dilemma, regardless of the outcome, a person becomes morally depleted. This moral depletion 
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then negatively effects a person’s own motivation to see themselves as moral and cooperative, in 
turn causing them to act more selfishly in a social decision that follows.  
Betrayal and selfishness 
For our second hypothesis, we believed that being betrayed in a social dilemma would 
negatively influence pro-social decision-making more than being shown loyalty. Based on 
extensive literature describing how the experience of betrayal has several negative outcomes 
related to one’s psychological health, happiness, and wellbeing, and results in a prototypically 
negative emotional experience (Fitness 2001; Jones & Burdette, 1994; Rachman, 2010; Fehr & 
Baldwin, 1996), we thought that the negative emotional and social experiences associated with 
being betrayed would results in higher levels of selfish decision making in a succeeding social 
decision. More specifically, we believed we would find a moral contagion effect (Hofmann, 
Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014) where becoming the target of an immoral act (e.g. 
experiencing betrayal) would result in people being more likely to do make a negative choice in 
social decision that follows.  
Method 
Overview of the current study 
To test our two hypotheses, we randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: 
loyalty, betrayal, or no social dilemma. The study consisted of two phases: 
Phase 1. Baseline affect and social connectedness were recorded via questionnaires 
administered on Qualtrics. Next, participants in the loyalty and betrayal condition were given 
two $5 bills each, while participants in the no social dilemma condition were given one $5 bill. 
Participants in the loyalty and betrayal conditions were instructed that they would use one of the 
$5 bills in the first task, and should hold onto the second $5 bill until the second task. Then, 
SOCIAL	  DILEMMAS	  AND	  SOCIAL	  DECISION	  MAKING	   9	  
participants in the loyalty and betrayal conditions experienced a social dilemma by taking part in 
a modified version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). As part of the modified PD participants 
contributed one $5 bill each to create a $10 prize. They were also led to believe that a fellow 
participant had either cooperated with  (loyalty condition) or defected from them (betrayal 
condition). Participants in the no social dilemma condition did not experience the modified PD; 
they remained at their computer and were asked to make a social decision of what to with their 
$5 bill. 
Phase 2. After playing the game, participants in the loyalty and betrayal conditions were 
asked about whether they would like to keep or give away $5 that the experimenter had given 
them as part of the cover story at the beginning of the study. This allowed us to compare the 
differences in social decision-making (e.g. what to do with $5) between those who just made a 
decision in a social dilemma and those who had not. Additionally, participants in the loyalty and 
betrayal conditions were asked to report their current levels of emotion and social 
connectedness.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the University of Michigan Psychology Paid Subject 
Pool and included one hundred and ninety seven adults aged 18 and over. Participants were 
offered the opportunity to earn up to $15 by answering several survey questions, taking part in a 
game, and making a social decision. In addition to the 197 participants, we excluded 26 other 
individuals from our analyses because they had either, taken part in a previous version of our 
study which was similar, or did not agree to split the jackpot with each other during the modified 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The average participant age was 21.37 ranging from a minimum of 18 to a 
maximum of 54, while participant gender breakdown was 73.1% female (N = 144), 26.4% male 
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(N = 52), and 0.5% another sex identity (N = 1).  
Cover Story 
We told participants that they would be taking part in a study on personality and 
economic decision-making. Participants assigned to the loyalty and betrayal conditions were told 
they would be taking part in a game together, and as such each given two $5 bills before playing 
together. They were instructed that the first $5 bill would be used while playing the game, and 
that they should hold onto the second $5 bill until they were asked to make a social decision 
about how they would like to distribute or keep their compensation. Participants were further 
instructed that the research assistant would indicate when it was time to make the decision with 
the second $5 bill.  
Participants assigned to the no social dilemma condition did not take part in the game, 
and consequently only received one $5 bill to be used in a social decision regarding their 
compensation. These participants were given their $5 bill in phase one, directly after completing 
the baseline affect and connected questionnaire.  
To add to the realism of the money being at stake, research assistants collected the $5 
bills (promising to hold onto the money and distribute as appropriate based on the participant’s 
choices) before any decisions were made in either the social dilemma in task one or the social 
decision in task two. Although participants were led to believe their decision of what do with 
their $5 in compensation was real, at the end of the study all participants received at least $5 
from the second task (regardless of the option they actually chose).  
Materials 
Baseline Affect and Connectedness Questionnaire. Immediately after the informed 
consent process and directly after being assigned their experimental condition, each participant 
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was asked the following questions Q1-Q7 (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). The 
order of Q2, Q3 were fixed as the first two questions, while order randomization was applied to 
Q1, & Q4-Q7.  
Q1. How close do you feel to the other participant?  
Q2. How do you feel?  
Q3. How aroused are you?  
Q4. How angry are you?  
Q5. How happy are you?  
Q6. How sad are you?  
Q7. How do you feel socially right now?  
Task one (e.g. social dilemma). We used a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma with the 
following design. Participants were first placed across from one another at a table with two 
golden balls in front of each of them. They were then told that each ball either contains the word 
split or steal, and they would now have to make a decision about whether to split or steal a $10 
prize. After collecting $5 from each participant (as the contribution to the prize), the research 
assistant then instructs the participants that depending on their decision the prize will be 
allocated as follows. If both participants actually choose the split ball, the prize will be shared 
fifty-fifty, or $5 each. This condition produces a mutual benefit to both individuals, and 
operationalizes the cooperating conditions in the original prisoner’s dilemma. Conversely, if both 
participants actually choose the steal ball, neither will receive any portion of the prize. This 
serves as our defection operationalization as similarly to both being locked up five years in the 
original dilemma, the decision to defect results in negative consequences for both participants. 
Lastly, if one participant actually chooses the steal ball, while the other participant actually 
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chooses the split ball, the participant who chose the steal ball will win the entire prize ($10). This 
operationalizes the remaining two conditions in the original dilemma in which one individual 
gets off completely (a large benefit), while the other individual gets a long prison sentence (an 
extremely negative consequence, just like receiving none of the prize). Participants in the loyalty 
condition who chose to split (e.g. all loyalty condition participants we included in our analyses) 
were told the other participant also decided to split and as such, attained a mutually beneficial 
outcome ($5). Participants in the betrayal condition were told the other participant decided to 
steal, regardless of whether they actually chose to split or steal. As such, they attained the highly 
negative outcomes in which they received $0 (believing that the other participant had actually 
chosen steal and betrayed them).  
Post-social dilemma appraisal questionnaire. Immediately after participants in the 
loyalty and betrayal conditions received notification as to what their partner had decided to do 
they were asked the following questions Q1-Q13 (see Table 4 for means and standard 
deviations). The order of Q2, Q3, Q8, Q9, and Q13 were fixed, while order randomization was 
applied to Q1, & Q4-Q7, Q11-Q12.  
Q1. How close do you feel to the other participant?   
Q2. How do you feel?  
Q3. How aroused are you?  
Q4. How angry are you?  
Q5. How happy are you?  
Q6. How regretful are you? 
Q7. How sad are you?  
Q8. How do you feel socially right now?  
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Q9. How do you feel about the other participant?  
Q10. How do you feel about yourself?  
Q11. How much do you want to harm the other participant emotionally?  
Q12. How much do you want to harm the other participant physically?  
Q13. If you were to play this game again with the same person what is the likelihood that 
you would change your decision?  
Task two (e.g. social decision). In the final phase of the study participants were 
presented with four unique choices of what to do with the $5 bill they received earlier on in the 
study. The four choices were as follows:  
 Selfish. Participants could choose to simply keep the $5.  
 Cooperative. Participants could choose to keep half of their $5 compensation and send 
the other half as an unexpected bonus to a future participant.  
 Parochial. Participants could choose to send the $5 in the form of a gift card and a nice 
note to a friend or family member of their choosing.  
Altruistic. Participants could choose to donate the $5 to a charity of their choice, and the 
$5 donation would be doubled to $10. 
Results 
Hypothesis I 
To test our first hypothesis, that experiencing a social dilemma would negatively 
influence pro-social decision-making, we determined the proportion of selfish, cooperative, 
parochial and altruistic decisions made by subjects within all three experimental conditions 
(loyalty, betrayal, no social dilemma) (see Table 1). Interestingly, although enough participants 
in the no social dilemma condition chose to act parochially (17.5%), or cooperatively (14.3%) 
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within the decision in our second task, the extremely low rate at which those in the loyalty or 
betrayal condition chose to act cooperatively (loyalty, 1.4%; betrayal, 3.2%) or parochially 
(loyalty, 0.0%; betrayal, 8.1%) initially prevented us from running a valid cross tabulation. This 
was due to the total number of participants making each respective choice within both conditions 
being five or less. However, seeing as our operationalized conceptions of parochial, cooperative, 
and altruistic decisions were all pro-social in nature, we decided to collapse the categories into 
one category (pro-sociality).  Creating a large enough sample size across two behavioral 
dimensions (selfishness and pro-sociality), we observed large differences in the frequency of 
pro-social and selfish decisions between participants in the no social dilemma condition, and 
participants in either the loyalty, or betrayal conditions (see Table 2).  
We recoded the loyalty and betrayal conditions into a new social dilemma variable (N = 
134) that is representative of all non-excluded participants who took part in the primary social 
dilemma. A chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the task two decisions of 
those in the social dilemma condition to the task two decisions of those in the no social dilemma 
condition. As predicted, there was a significant relationship between being in the social dilemma 
condition and decision making in task two, χ2 (2, 197) = 26.98, p < .001, OR = 0.18 [0.09, 0.33]), 
suggesting that participants who played the game in task one (e.g. the social dilemma) were 
nearly twice as likely to keep the five dollars for themselves compared to participants who did 
not play the game in task one (see Figure 1).  
Hypothesis II 
 We also hypothesized that experiencing betrayal (more so than loyalty) within a social 
dilemma would negatively influence how likely participants would be to give $5 away to another 
person or charity after they participated in the prisoner’s dilemma game. To address this question 
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we examined how participants in the loyalty condition (N = 72) differed from participants in the 
betrayal condition ((N = 62) on selfish and pro-social behavior in task two. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, we found no significant differences in selfish or pro-social decision making between 
participants that experienced loyalty or betrayal while participating in the preceding social 
dilemma, χ2 (1, 134) = .56, p = .456 (see Figure 2).  
Self-report measures 
 Groups did not differ significantly at baseline on any of the questionnaires we 
administered (see Table 3). However when we looked at how participants felt emotionally and 
socially after taking part in the social dilemma, significant differences (between those who had 
experienced either loyalty or betrayal) were found across nearly every emotional and social 
dimension question (see Table 4). In fact, while participants in the betrayal condition displayed 
higher levels of anger (M = 3.39, SD = 1.7, p < .001), regret (M = 3.5, SD = 1.86, p < .001), 
sadness (M = 3.39, SD = 1.74, p < .001), desire to emotionally harm the other participant (M = 
1.07, SD = 0.31, p <  .001), and willingness to play again with the same partner (M = 3.55, SD = 
2.1, p < .001), participants in the loyalty condition displayed higher feelings of closeness to the 
other participant (M = 4.13, SD = 1.29, p < .001), valence (M = 6.25, SD = 1.05, p < .001), 
happiness (M = 5.85, SD = 1.02, p < .001), attitude towards others (M = 6.17, SD = 0.92, p < 
.001), and attitudes towards themselves (M = 6.14, SD = 1.07, p < .001). The only emotional 
affect question for which no significant differences were found was arousal (M = 3.47, SD = 1.7, 
p = 0.78).  
It is striking that these differences in subjective experience, did not translate into 
subsequent behavioral effects on the decision to give money to someone else (i.e., our second 
hypothesis). However, it is well established that responses assessed across different levels of 
SOCIAL	  DILEMMAS	  AND	  SOCIAL	  DECISION	  MAKING	   16	  
analysis (e.g., subjective report and behavioral) do not always adhere (Vinski & Watter, 2012; 
Jack & Roepstorff, 2002; Orne, 1962). Future research is needed to address this issue further, as 
we elaborate on below.  
Discussion 
Our finding that participants in the social dilemma condition made significantly more 
selfish decisions than participants in the no social dilemma condition supported our original 
hypothesis that taking part in a social dilemma negatively influences pro-social decision-making. 
This finding suggests that experiencing a social dilemma, regardless of the outcome, causes a 
person to behave more negatively. Seeing as one major difference between participants in the no 
social dilemma and social dilemma condition was participation in a social dilemma task, it 
appears that somehow taking part in our modified PD affected subjects’ subsequent social 
decision making. More specifically, on the surface it appears that playing our game resulted in 
subjects generally acting more selfishly during our second social decision making task. On the 
basis of this finding, we speculate that taking part in a social dilemma results in depletion of the 
resources needed to exert self-control in a moral decision making task (Sheldon & Fishbach, 
2015; Sowden & Kross, in-prep), and that differences in depletion of self-control between those 
in the social dilemma and no social dilemma conditions drove the effect of social dilemma on 
increasing selfish decision making. However, because we did not incorporate an index of 
depletion into our present design we cannot conclude that moral depletion drives this effect. 
Future research is needed to address this issue. Additionally, there may be other factors at play 
driving this effect either alone or in combination with one another, ranging from the ideas 
surrounding how money being at stake influences our moral judgments and decision making, to 
the effects that socializing with other individuals have on those same instances of moral 
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judgments and decision making. Future research is needed to follow-up on these ideas as well.   
Our second hypothesis that experiencing betrayal by one’s (game) partner would 
negatively influence pro-social decision-making, more so than experiencing loyalty does, was 
not supported by our findings. This being the case, we then sought to analyze the baseline and 
post-dilemma affect and connected questionnaire responses for any insights into why our 
hypothesis was unsubstantiated. We noted that while there were no significant differences in 
baseline affect and connectedness between those in the loyalty and betrayal conditions, across 
the board differences were found in post-dilemma appraisals for every category except arousal. 
Observing that the post dilemma appraisals measuring emotional experiences such as happiness, 
sadness and regret differed significantly between those in the loyalty and betrayal conditions, 
with participants in the loyalty group showing more happiness, valence, feelings of closeness to 
the other participants, and feelings of social connectedness, it is clear that taking part in one 
condition or the other resulted in distinct emotional experiences. However, even with finding 
large differences in post dilemma emotional experience and social connectedness between 
groups, it is possible we did not find an effect of condition (loyalty vs. betrayal) on social 
decision in task two because something other than emotion or social connectivity is driving any 
true effects.  
Future Studies 
Although these findings raise multiple ideas for future research, finding a means to 
mitigate the differences we found in pro-social behavior between the social dilemma and no 
social dilemma conditions stands out as most important. First, I would like to test whether 
employing a self-distancing intervention could change any of the differences we found in pro-
social and selfish behavior between the social dilemma and no social dilemma conditions. More 
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broadly, future research is needed to examine how people can regulate their moral reasoning. 
Adam Smith suggested that the ability to examine one’s feelings and behaviors from a third party 
observer perspective is required for the development of a moral self (Smith, 1790). He argues 
that examining one’s feelings and behaviors from a third party observer perspective results in 
people both, developing enhanced emotional control and placing more weights on the rights and 
interests of others (e.g. a fundamental aspect of pro-sociality). While an existing body of 
literature has shown that self-distancing does indeed enhance emotional control (Ayduk & Kross, 
2010; Kross & Ayduk, 2011), virtually no research has examined the second portion of his claim 
that self-distancing will increase pro-sociality. 
Second, I would like to see how having participants build up a relationship across 
multiple rounds of the game before making a second social decision about what do with their 
compensation, affects post dilemma emotional experience, social connectedness, and selfish and 
pro-social decision making. This is an important question to ask because in real world decision 
making people’s decisions of whether to cooperate with or defect from another frequently 
depend on how positively or negatively they view their previous interactions with that individual. 
In allowing participants to build stronger relationships before making a social decision about 
their compensation, they will learn more information about each other’s decision-making 
behavior. Depending on the type and context of this additional information, having it could lead 
participants to display higher (or lower) differences in selfish and pro-social behavior between 
groups.  
Third, noting that previous research has speculated that differences in emotional 
responses to social situations underlie our social decision-making (Jones & Burdette, 1994; 
Rachman, 2010), I plan to test whether controlling for emotional experience could reveal any 
SOCIAL	  DILEMMAS	  AND	  SOCIAL	  DECISION	  MAKING	   19	  
possible effects we missed between loyalty and betrayal conditions and the social decision in 
task two. On the surface it is possible that when how negatively the participants felt after being 
betrayed in our task one is taken into account, being betrayed leads to participants choosing the 
pro-social (cooperative, parochial, or altruistic) choice in our social dilemma more often than 
their counterparts in the loyalty condition. Thinking about this from a personal perspective, a 
person who feels really bad about being betrayed by someone could very well behave differently 
from a person who does not feel as bad about the betrayal.  
Conclusion Statement 
 In conclusion, our finding that social dilemmas in and of themselves influence 
subsequent moral judgment and decision-making could have important theoretical and practical 
implications. By incorporating indices for moral depletion and self-control in future research, we 
can further isolate the mechanisms behind our observed effect of social dilemma condition on 
selfish decision-making in task two. Noting that our second hypothesis that betrayal would 
influence selfish decision making in task two more so than loyalty did was unsubstantiated, these 
results appear to demonstrate that although experiencing a social dilemma makes a person more 
selfish, how that person is treated while in the social dilemma does not. However, to fully 
understand this finding, we explored the pre- and post-dilemma questions that we asked the 
participants to see if incorporating those representative psychological processes could shed 
insight into this observation. Despite finding significant differences in post dilemma affect and 
connectedness between loyalty and betrayal condition participants, no significant differences in 
selfish or pro-social decision-making were observed. Perhaps though factors such as emotional 
valence (reported strength of the feeling) need to be accounted for in order for effects such as 
betrayal on pro-sociality to reveal themselves. Future research would do well to explore this. 
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Tables 
Table 1.  
Proportion of Selfish, Cooperative, Parochial, and Altruistic Decisions by Experimental 
Condition 
Condition 
Loyalty 
Betrayal 
No SD 
Total 
Selfish Parochial Altruistic  Cooperative 
53 (73.6%) 0 (0%) 18 (25%) 1 (1.4%) 
42 (67.7%) 5 (2.3%) 13 (21%) 2 (3.2%) 
18 (28.6%) 11 (17.%) 25 (39.7%) 9 (14.3%) 
113 (57.4%) 16 (8.1%) 56 (28.4%) 12 (6.1%) 
Note: Table 1 shows the proportion of selfish, cooperative, parochial and altruistic decisions 
made by subjects within all three experimental conditions [loyalty, betrayal, (No SD = no social 
dilemma] 
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Table 2. 
Proportion of Selfish and Pro-Social Decisions by Experimental Condition 
Condition Selfish Pro-Social 
Loyalty 53 (73.6%) 19 (26.4%) 
Betrayal 42 (67.7%) 20 (32.3%) 
No Social Dilemma 18 (28.6%) 45 (71.4%) 
Total 113 (57.4%) 84 (42.6%) 
Note: Table 2 shows the proportion of selfish or pro-social (cooperative, parochial, or altruistic) 
decisions made by subjects within all three experimental conditions [loyalty, betrayal, control 
e.g. no social dilemma)].  
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Table 3 
Differences in Baseline Affect and Connectedness Between Social Dilemma Condition 
Participants 
 Close Valence Arousal  Angry Happy Sad Connected 
Loyalty 1.67  
(1.2) 
5.68  
(1.1) 
2.85  
(1.47) 
1.78 
(1.18) 
5.14  
(.98) 
2.44  
(1.17) 
4.46 
(1.7) 
Betrayal 1.81 
(1.13) 
5.69 
(1.07) 
3.16 
(1.6) 
1.68 
(1.07) 
5.02 
(1.17) 
2.15 
(1.13) 
4.63 
(1.44) 
Sig. p = .332 p = .694 p = .321 p = .784 p = .803 p = .301 p = .823 
Note. Means (Standard Deviations). Table 3 shows that there is no difference between the two 
social dilemma groups (loyalty and betrayal conditions) on any of the items from the baseline 
affect and connectedness questionnaire.  
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Table 4 
Differences in Post Dilemma Affect and Connectedness Between Social Dilemma Condition 
Participants 
 Close Valence Arousal  Angry Happy Regretful Sad 
Loyalty 4.13  
(1.29) 
6.25  
(1.05) 
3.47 
(1.7) 
1.31 
(.69) 
5.85 
(1.02) 
1.53 
(.95) 
1.57 
(.99) 
Betrayal 1.89 
(1.33) 
3.16 
(1.66) 
3.39 
(1.73) 
3.9 
(1.87) 
3.47 
(1.34) 
3.5 
(1.86) 
3.39 
(1.74) 
Sig. p < .001* p = < .001* p = .78 p < .001* p < .001* p < .001* p < .001* 
 
 Connected Attitude - 
other 
Attitude - 
self 
Harm - 
emotional 
Harm – 
physical 
Play again 
Loyalty 5.28  
(1.27) 
6.17  
(.92) 
6.14  
(1.07) 
1.07 
(.31) 
1.03 
(.17) 
1.85 
(1.16) 
Betrayal 3.48 
(1.49) 
2.89 
(1.34) 
5.11 
(1.54) 
1.87 
(1.43) 
1.4 
(97) 
3.55 
(2.1) 
Sig. p < .001* p < .001* p < .001* p < .001* p = .004* p < .001* 
 
Note: ρ < 0.05 are noted with a *. Table 4 shows that across all of the items (minus arousal1) in 
the post-dilemma appraisal questionnaire there are differences between the loyalty and betrayal 
conditions.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Which may be explained by the awkwardness of the question; in future studies, especially with 
undergraduates, we should probably not use arousal and instead use “excited” or something 
similar	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Figures 
	  
Figure	  1.	  Figure	  1	  shows	  the	  differences	  in	  selfish	  and	  pro-­‐social	  behaviors	  between	  participants	  
in	  the	  social	  dilemma	  and	  no	  social	  dilemma	  conditions.	  Χ2	  (1,	  n	  =	  197)	  =	  26.98,	  p	  <	  .001,	  OR	  
=	  .172	  [.088,	  .334].	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Figure 2. Figure 2 shows	  there no real differences in instances of selfish or pro-social behavior 
between participants in either the loyalty or betrayal conditions, Χ2 (1, n = 134,) = 0.56, p = .456, 
OR = 1.33 [.629, 2.804].	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
